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Abstract: The Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) has played 
an important role in guarding the Sunni > orthodoxy in 
contemporary Indonesia. As it has chapters in almost parts 
of Indonesia in the provincial, district and municipality 
level, this role has been also translated into the local 
context. The strength of the MUI stems from “semi-
officiality” and “semi-representative” nature of the 
organisation. This article is aimed to analyse this role in the 
post-New Order period, after the establishment of the 
Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) of Banten province in 
2001, especially in dealing with deviant beliefs or sects and 
shirk (polytheist) and bid‘ah (religious innovation) practices. 
It is to show that orthodoxy and heterodoxy is not purely 
religious, but also political, as this is related to the problem 
of authority and power.  
Keywords: Majelis Ulama Indonesia, local politics, Banten, 
Orthodoxy. 
Introduction 
The collapse of the Indonesia’s New Order regime in May 1998 
led the Bantenese people to see it as political opportunity to separate 
                                                          
1 I would like to thank Prof Martin van Bruinessen and Prof M Amin Abdullah for 
reading the first draft of this paper and giving invaluable critical comments. I would 
like also to thank Dr Mufti Ali, Ayatullah Homaeni and Rohman for their kind help 
during my fieldwork in Banten. My gratitude also goes to the Royal Dutch Academy of 
Science (KNAW) in the framework of Scientific Programme Indonesia Netherlands 
(SPIN) which made this research possible, and the late ISIM (International Institute 
for the Study of Islam in the Modern World), the Netherlands, in which the first draft 
of this article was written. 
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from West Java province and establish an independent province, a 
demand which was finally granted in 2000, during the era of President 
Abdurrahman Wahid. 2 This endeavour was driven mainly by the 
previous unfair policies made by both central and the West Java 
provincial government towards Banten.3 Since then there had been 
local euphoria in various aspects of life, including religious one. As a 
widely-known religiously Islamic society or to use Bruinessen’s term a 
“self-conscious” Muslim region,4 due to existence of Banten Sultanate 
in the past and the fact that Muslims occupy majority (more than 94%) 
of population, the issue of implementation of shari>‘ah was part and 
parcel of the formation of the new Banten province.5 However, the 
concept of shari>‘ah, as in any other regions, was not clearly defined by 
its supporters. Some understand it as fiqh (Islamic law) and some other 
as a comprehensive way of life. Some understand it culturally as 
Islamic practices so far implemented by society and support cultural 
Islamisation through education and various cultural approaches and 
some others understand it structurally through state intervention in the 
forms of shari >‘ah-inspired bylaws (Peraturan Daerah/Perda) and other 
Islam biased decrees and policies.    
It is widely acknowledged that ‘ulama>’ (religiously learned men) 
have central role in Bantenese society.  However, their importance 
could not be generalised, depending on what kind of ‘ulama>’ they are. 
Individual ‘ulama>’ can be classified into four: 1) educational ulama who 
                                                          
2 Based on Law No. 23/2000 on the Creation of Banten Province, issued on 17 
October 2000 by President Abdurrahman Wahid. On 18 November 2000, Banten was 
formally declared as the 30th province. 
3 The marginalisation of Banten dates back in fact to the Dutch colonial period, 
especially since the famous 1888 rebellion. Sartono Kartodirdjo, The Peasants’ Revolt of 
Banten in 1888: Its Conditions, Course and Sequel, ‘S-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966. 
4 Martin van Bruinessen, “Shari'a Court, Tarekat and Pesantren: Religious Institutions 
in the Banten Sultanate, Archipel, 50 (1995), pp.165-199; Martin van Bruinessen, Kitab 
Kuning, Pesantren dan Tarekat: Tradisi-tradisi Islam di Indonesia, 3rd ed., Bandung: Mizan, 
1999, p. 246. 
5 The number of religious population in Banten in 2004 was as follows: Muslims 
8,617,950; Protestants 157,707; Catholics 92,253; Hindus 8.051; Buddhists 110.280; 
Confucians 2.072; others 15,213; no indication 124.397. The number of Muslims in 
2004 was 94,4% of the total population. Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Banten, Banten 
Dalam Angka/Banten in Figures 2005, Banten: Badan Perencanaan Daerah dan Badan 
Pusat Statistik Provinsi Banten, 2005, p. 123.  
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teach at pesantren (Islamic boarding school) or madrasah, 2) 
organisational ulama of Islamic organisations (Muhammadiyah, 
Nahdlatul Ulama [NU], Mathla‘ul Anwar, al-Khaeriyah and Persatuan 
Islam [Persis]), 3) political ulama who are involved in political parties; 
4) activist ‘ulama>’of new Islamist movements, and 5) semi-official 
‘ulama>’of the MUI.6 This category is not clear-cut, however, some 
‘ulama>’fall into more than one category. Some semi-official ‘ulama>’, for 
instance, are also members of Islamic organisations or new Islamist 
movements, or teach at pesantren. In certain context, some ‘ulama>’ may 
claim to represent certain Islamic organization, for instance, rather 
than other membership. However, apart from the individual ‘ulama>’, 
there are also ‘ulama>’institutions, such as Majelis Ulama Indonesia 
(MUI—Indonesian Council of Ulama) and ‘ulama>’ institutions as part 
of bigger Muslim organisations (as sub-organisations), such as Majelis 
Tarjih of Muhammadiyah, Lembaga Bahtsul Masa’il of NU and Dewan 
Hisbah of Persatuan Islam (Persis).  
The Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) is one of the most important 
‘ulama>’ institutions in Banten. The MUI is a gigantic ‘ulama>’ council 
which has a central headquarter in Jakarta and has provincial and 
district branches in all over Indonesia, especially in Muslim majority 
regions. The role of MUI in Banten is well reflected in some fields, 
such as in representing and coordinating the cooperation between 
Islamic organisations and movements, in performing official politics in 
the region, and in guarding Sunni orthodoxy. The present article is 
aimed to analyse the role of the MUI of Banten province in the in 
guarding Sunni> orthodoxy in the post-New Order period, especially 
after its establishment in 2001, especially in defending Orthodoxy from 
                                                          
6 Hudaeri classified “kiyai” into “kiyai kitab”, the `ulama >’ who master textual religious 
knowledge, and “kiyai hikmah”, the `ulama > who master the Islam-based spiritual and 
magical knowledge. On the role of kiyai (local `ulama >) in Banten, see M.A. Tihami, 
“Kiyai dan Jawara di Banten,” unpublished MA Thesis, Universitas Indonesia, 1992; 
Mohamad Hudaeri et al, “Tasbih dan Golok: Studi tentang Karisma Kiyai dan Jawara 
di Banten,” Istiqro’ 2:1 (2003), pp. 57-87; Abdul Hamid, “The Kiai in Banten: Shifting 
Roles in Changing Times,” in Ota Atsushi, Okamoto Masaaki, and Ahmad Suaedy 
(eds.), Islam in Contention: Rethinking Islam and State in Indonesia, Jakarta: Wahid Institute, 
Center for Southeast Asian studies (CSEAS) and Center for Asia-Pacific Area Studies 
(CAPAS), 2010, pp. 421-443. I will not study individual `ulama >, but MUI as `ulama > 
council or as an organisation containing membership of various backgrounds. The 
term “MUI `ulama >” refer to those represent MUI leadership or membership. 
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deviant beliefs or sects, from shirk (polytheist) practices and in some 
cases also from bid‘a (religious innovation) practices.7 This article, 
therefore, seeks to get some answers to the question: how does the 
MUI play role in the protection of Islamic orthodoxy in Banten after 
the collapse of the New Order? I will also argue show that orthodoxy 
and heterodoxy is not purely religious, but also political, as this is 
related to the problem of authority and power. 
The MUI of Banten: Local Guardian of Orthodoxy 
The establishment of the Banten province in 2000 was followed by 
the establishment of the MUI in the provincial level in 2001.8 There 
was one MUI chapter at provincial level and were four district MUI 
chapters at in Serang, Pandeglang, Lebak, and Tangerang, and two 
municipal MUI chapters in Kota Tangerang and Kota Cilegon—later 
two other two municipality MUI chapters were formed following the 
creation of Kota Serang and Kota Tangerang Selatan in 2008.9 The 
board members of the MUI of Banten were representatives of the 
district and municipal MUIs and the “representatives” of some Muslim 
organisations.10 The former general chairperson of MUI of Serang 
                                                          
7 The discussion on Shari‘a-inspired bylaws (Perda) is excluded from the scope of this 
paper. On the role of the MUI in the discourse of Shari‘a-inspired bylaws, see 
Rohman, “Mediating the Interests: The Study of the Council of ’Ulamā‘ Indonesia of 
Banten Province’s Roles on the Discourse of the Implementation of Syarī’ah in 
Banten,” Alqalam, 28: 1 (January-April 2011), pp. 35-63. 
8 On the MUI in the national level during the New Order, see M. Atho’ Mudzhar, 
Fatwas of the Council of Indonesia Ulama: A Study of Islamic Legal Thought in Indonesia 1975-
1988, Jakarta: Indonesian-Netherlands Cooperation in Islamic Studies (INIS), 1993; 
Nadirsyah Hosen, “Behind the Scenes:  Fatwas of Majelis Ulama Indonesia. (1975–
1998), Journal of Islamic Studies 15, no. 2 (2004): pp. 147–79; and on the MUI after the 
New Order, see Moch Nur Ichwan, “‘Ulama’, State and Politics: Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia after Suharto,” Islamic Law and Society 12, 1 (2005), pp. 45-72; Moch Nur 
Ichwan, “Towards a Puritanical Moderate Islam: The Majelis Ulama Indonesia and the 
Politics of Religious Orthodoxy,” in Martin van Bruinessen (ed.), Contemporary 
Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the ‘Conservative Turn’, Singapore: ISEAS, 2013 
(forthcoming), pp. 60-104. 
9 I maintain the term “Kota”, which in this context signifies municipality, in order not 
to confuse municipality with district, because there are districts and municipalities 
which have similar name, such as Serang and Tangerang.   
10 I added quotation marks to the word “representatives” to emphasise that the 
representativeness of Islamic organisations is actually informally, because there is no 
formal appointment from each organisation.  
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district, Prof. KH Abdul Wahab Afif, MA, 11 was appointed as the first 
general chairperson of the Banten MUI for the period of 2001-2006.12 
Before this appointment, he was the general chairperson of MUI 
Serang for two periods (from 1990-2001). He was re-elected later for 
the second period of 2006-2011.13 The MUI of Banten, like other MUI 
in other provinces, dependents financially on the government support 
in each structural level (province, municipality, district, and sub-
district). The amount of grants differs from region to region and from 
year to year, depending much on the political will of the government 
and the parliament in respective region. Because of this, the MUI 
could not separate itself from the gript of the state and has been always 
perceived as “official” institution. Government, police, judges and 
media have treated the MUI as if it is part of state institution.  
In its statues formulated after the New Order, the MUI has some 
roles formulated in its statutes: 1) as inheritor of the prophet (warathat 
al-anbiya>’); 2) as fatwa> giver (mufti>); 3) as guide and servant of Muslim 
                                                          
11 Before this appointment, Prof KH Abdul Wahab Afif was the general chairperson 
of MUI Serang for two periods (from 1990-2001). He was also a leader of al-
Khaeriyah, a local Muslim organization, and university-based scholar, graduated from 
the Al-Azhar university, Egypt, and he was also the Dean of State Institute for Islamic 
Studies (IAIN) Sunan Gunung Djati in Serang (now IAIN Maulana Hasanuddin 
Serang) and professor of Islamic law at the same institute, and rector of Banten 
Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIB). Abdul Wahab Afif was a renowned figure of 
Golkar, the ruling party during the New Order, in Banten. He was a member of 
Provincial Board of Golkar in West Java Province. In 1980, he was a member of the 
Advisory Council of Golkar in Serang District. Later he also became one of the 
members of Dewan Pimpinan Pusat (National Board) of Satkar Ulama, an `ulama > sub-
organisation of the Golkar. (Tihami 2006: 25, 158; Hamid 428, n. 4,5). On his 
biography from his birthday in 1936 to 1966, see M.A. Tihami et al. Refleksi Pemikiran 
Fiqh: Mensyukuri 70 tahun Prof. K.H. Abdul Wahab Afif, MA, Serang: Yayasan SengPho 
Banten, 2007, 1-38.    
12 In order not to confuse the readers, it should be noted that the MUI leadership 
contains one “general chairperson” and some “chairpersons”. The chairpersons usually 
represent commissions within the MUI as well as represent Muslim organisations.  
13 The MUI Regional Congress in 2006 re-elected KH Wahab Afif as the general 
chairperson for the period of 2006-2011. However, this was not easy that he came to 
his second period, because there was a demand for reforming the MUI by young board 
members. Ustadh Yasin Muthohar, the leader of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) of 
Banten, was among this critical group. After a long negotiation, however, this critical 
group agreed on his appointment with a condition that he should reform the MUI so 
that it actively endorse Islamic shari‘a in Banten. Interview with Yasin Muthohar, leader 
of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) of Banten, 6 June 2008. 
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community (ra>’i wa kha>dim al-ummah); 4) upholder of the commanding 
to the known good and forbidding the reprehensible (al-amr bi al-ma‘ru >f 
wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar); 5) as pioneer in the reform movement (tajdi>d) 
in Islamic thought; 6) as pioneer in the reconciliation movement (is}la>h}) 
among the ummah.14 This self-portrayal has given the MUI strong 
confidence and justification to claim the rights to deal with Islamic and 
Muslim affairs and to protect Sunni orthodoxy. This is not only the 
case of the central MUI but also some local branches, including the 
MUI of Banten province. The latter has been actively engaged in 
responding to Islamic religious issues emerging in the region and in 
issuing fatwa>s in line with Sunni orthodoxy. 
As a matter of fact, there is no single orthodoxy in Islam, because 
there is no Church and pope in Islam. From the early period of Islam, 
Muslims have been divided into two major schools of theology 
(madhhabs): Sunnism and Shi‘ism. This means also that there are two 
major orthodoxies, viz., Sunni > orthodoxy and Shi’i> orthodoxy. Since 
Sunnism is the majority in almost all Muslim lands, except in Iran, Iraq, 
Azerbaijan and Bahrain, it has become, as Ayubi calls it, “state Islam” 
in those countries. As state Islam, the Sunni orthodoxy dominates the 
interpretation of Islam and defines which interpretation is acceptable 
(h}ala>l, shar‘i >, mu‘tabar) and unacceptable (h}ara>m, bid‘ah, zandaqah, riddah, 
kufr), and uses the hands of the state to enforce it.15 In this sense 
orthodoxy and heterodoxy are not merely religious issue but also 
political one. This is what happens also with Sunni> orthodoxy in 
Indonesia. The Sunnism has become the “state Islam” adopted, 
despite informally, by the state and guarded by the MUI, including the 
MUI of Banten. The following discussion on deviant beliefs and sects, 
polytheist practices, and bid‘ah (religious innovation) will show this 
position. We shall see also that the MUI has realised about the power 
of being perceived as “official”, or “semi-official”, and “representative” 
body, despite the fact that it is actually “societal” and “semi-
                                                          
14 Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Himpunan Keputusan Musyawarah Nasional VII Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia tahun 2005, Jakarta: Sekretariat Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 2005, pp.24-6.  
15 Nazih N. Ayubi, “State Islam and Communal Plurality,” Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 524, Political Islam (Nov. 1992), pp. 79-91. 
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representative”, if not “pseudo-representative”.16 It has consciously 
used them to endorse its agendas and interests. 
Against Deviant Beliefs and Sects: Orthodoxy and Deviancy  
Heterodoxy has been always seen by the holder of Orthodoxy as 
potentially subversive.17 The MUI has long history of challenging 
heterodoxy, which is viewed as threatening the very heart of 
orthodoxy, that is, the pure faith. In the post-New Order era, the MUI 
has issued some fatwa>s on allegedly deviant beliefs and sects, such as 
fatwa>s on Ahmadiyah in 2005 (revising the fatwa>on the Qadiyan 
Ahmadiyah in 1980), on religious liberalism, secularism and pluralism 
(2005) and on Al-Qiyadah al-Islamiyah (2007). There are many similar 
fatwa>s issued by local MUIs. Confronted with many allegedly deviant 
beliefs and sects, and the challenge of the opponents of the fatwa>s, the 
central MUI issued later the “Guide for Identifying Deviant Belief 
Streams” (Pedoman Identifikasi Aliran Sesat) on 6 November 2007. The 
Guide consists of “ten criteria of deviancy”, which include: 
1. Rejecting the pillars of faith (rukun iman) and pillars of Islam (rukun 
Islam). 
2. Believing and/or following a belief (‘aqi>dah) incompatible with 
Shari‘a.  
3. Believing that there is revelation (wah}y) after the Qur’a>n.  
4. Rejecting the authenticity and/or the truth of the contents of the 
Qur’a>n.  
5. Interpreting the Qur’a>n without relying it on the (correct) 
principles of interpretation. 
6. Rejecting the prophetic tradition (H{adi>th) as a source of Islamic 
teachings   
7. Disrespecting, disgracing and/or downgrading the Prophets and 
Messengers (of Alla>h)  
8. Rejecting Muh}ammad as the final Prophet and Messenger.  
                                                          
16 It might be considered as “pseudo-representative”, because the procedure of the 
recruitment of its members from various Muslim organisations is actually informal, 
and its fatwa >s and decisions are not automatically binding upon other Muslim 
organisations. 
17 Martin van Bruinessen, “Transformations of Heterodoxy,” ISIM Newsletter Vol. 7:1 
(2001), 5. 
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9. Changing the principles of devotion (‘iba>dah) established by 
shari >‘ah.  
10. Charging other Muslims as “unbeliever” (ka>fir) without proper 
basis of shari>‘ah.18 
The above criteria reflect perfectly Sunni doctrines, which are set 
up as standard for measuring the “Islamness” of Muslim minds, bodies 
and institutions. These criteria have been used by many local MUI to 
claim certain beliefs, behaviours and sects as deviating from Islam or 
even committing infidelity.  
The MUI of Banten has been aware of its function as the guardian 
of Islamic belief against heresy, blasphemy, polytheism, and religious 
innovation. In the last years, there were some issues on “deviant 
sects”, such as Kunci Suci, Kandang Rosul, Wahidiyah, and 
Ahmadiyah—to mention some.19 Some of the fatwa>s were issued by 
district or municipal MUIs, and some others by the provincial MUI. 
The procedure of ifta>’ (issuing a fatwa>) stipulates that if a case found 
only in a certain district or municipality, the MUI of that area is 
responsible for responding it by issuing or not issuing a fatwa>, and if 
the same case is found in more than one district or municipality, the 
provincial MUI is responsible for responding it. Below are some cases 
dealt with by the MUI of Banten. 
Kunci Suci  
A new sect called Kunci Suci emerged in Baros, Pandeglang, in the 
mid of the 2000s. It was located in the pesantren Miftahul Huda, led 
by Nursyahidin Salim.20 He preached that human can see God in this 
world by conducting certain ritual of “mi‘raj” under the guidance of 
murshid (spiritual teacher). His understanding of mi‘raj is different from 
the general Sunni’s understanding of it, Mi‘raj was actually Prophet 
Muh}ammad’s spiritual experience of spiritual journey from Aqs }a > 
mosque in Jerussalem to Sidrat al-Muntaha> (utmost sky) to receive 
                                                          
18 Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Mengawal Aqidah Umat: Fatwa MUI tentang Aliran-aliran Sesat 
di Indonesia. Jakarta: Sekretariat Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 2008, 7-8. These criteria are 
included in Chapter VI of the Guide. 
19 There are some other allegedly deviant belief groups, such as Hakekok, Pengajian 
Nurul Yaqin and Islam Sejati. But I could not includes all of them in this short article. 
20 It was said that the headquarter of this sect was actually located in Padepokan Esa, 
Bintaro, Tangerang, another district of Banten. Kompas, 14 December 2007. 
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directly from God the obligation of salah five times a day. Nursyahidin 
Salim’s teaching is based on the books written by Abu Irsyad 
(Kuswanto), such as (1) Menyingkap Rahasia Shalat & Puasa sebagai 
Sarana Menemui Allah; (2) Bunga Rampai Hikmah Tasawuf; (3) Kunci 
Memahami Ilmu Ma‘rifatullah; (4) Mi‘raj Rohani Menemui Nur Ilahi. All of 
them are neo-Sufi books, published by Institute for Tasawwuf Study 
Az-Zukhruf, Jakarta, or Pustaka Aladdin, owned by Kuswanto 
himself.21  
According to Nursyahidin, mi‘raj is not exclusively the Prophet’s 
experience. Everybody can see God through the mediation guided by 
the murshid.22 The ritual is conducted on the white cloth, on which 
some rice and money are put. The person should close ears, eyes, nous, 
and mouth with his fingers. This act would form the word “Allah” in 
Arabic. After sometime, the murshid would ask the disciple whether 
he/she sees the light. If he/she affirms, the murshid would say that this 
light is the light of God and even God himself.23 This new teaching 
had disturbed surrounding community. The MUI of Baros took 
necessary actions by observing the sect, and making dialogue with 
Nursyahidin and his members in Baitul Iffah mosque, Baros, in the 
MUI office of Serang, and in the hall (pendapa) of Serang. The head of 
MUI of Serang, KH A Sjafei AN did not want to declare directly that 
the Kunci Suci was deviating. KH Sjafei saw that the fatwa> should be 
issued by the MUI of Banten province, because this sect did not only 
exist in Baros, but also in Tangerang.24 Being unsatisfied with the result 
of the dialogue at MUI chapter of Serang conducted that day, 
unknown crowds attacked Nursyahidin pesantren and burned it on 13 
December 2007. With the belief in mind that the sect was deviating, 
and not because of MUI’s fatwa>, the people attacked the pesantren.   
Because of such unintended violence, the Banten MUI then issued 
a fatwa> No. 1/2008, dated 16 January 2008, declaring that 
                                                          
21 I would like to thank Mohamad Hudaeri for making these books available to me.  
22 According to Abu Irsyad, one can meet or see God in this world. Abu Irsyad, 
Menyingkap Rahasia Shalat & Puasa sebagai Sarana Menemui Allah, Jakarta: Pustaka 
Aladdin, 2006, especially chapters 15-20. 
23 Interview with KH Drs A Sjafei AN, the general chairperson of the MUI of Serang, 
10 June 2008.   
24 Interview with KH Drs A Syefei AN, the general chairperson of the MUI of Serang, 
10 June 2008. 
  
Local Politics of Orthodoxy  
175 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 06, Number 01, June 2012 
Nursyahidin’s teaching deviated from Islam and requested the 
government to ban the group and close all centers of their activities.25 
The fatwa>also demanded that those who believe in the teachings to 
return to Islam based on the Qur’a>n and the Prophetic traditions 
(hadiths).26 The fatwa>was read by KH Aminudin, Lc, one of the 
chairpersons of Banten MUI at Baitul Iffah mosque of Baros on 23 
January 2008. However, the fact that the violence happened before the 
issuance of the fatwa>, this indicated that when “generalized belief” has 
accumulated MUI’s fatwa> or other authorities’ opinion is not needed.27  
Kandang Rosul 
Kandang Rasul is a local sect appeared in Karanganyar, Lebak. It 
emerged actually for the first time in 2005, but did not get wide 
attention until March 2008, when they show up in public. The name of 
the sect provoked Muslim criticism, since the word “kandang” which 
means “house of animal” is meant to be the house of the Rasul 
(Prophet). In addition, what is peculiar of this sect is that the members 
of Kandang Rasul should vow in the name of Allah, Jesus, Sanghyang 
and other god’s names that they would be loyal to the Kandang Rasul. 
They are not asked to pay or donate some amount of money, but 
instead they got promise from their leader that they would receive 
monthly financial support of IDR 30 million (about USD 3200) in 
undecided time in the future. It is a great amount of money, which 
even university professors or the highest rank of civil servant could not 
get it. The leader of the Kandang Rasul, coming from Tangerang, 
claimed that he had a great amount of money saved in a Swiss bank.  
The MUI of Lebak invited some of its members to the MUI office 
for interview and interrogation. From the data gathered from this 
interrogation, the MUI concluded that the Kandang Rosul is not an 
Islamic sect, but “Aliran Kepercayaan” (belief stream), which is 
beyond MUI’s authority. It was under the aegis of the Bakorpakem 
                                                          
25 The Banten MUI actually asked that the case was isolated in Baros or Serang, but the 
MUI of sub-district Baros and of district Serang could not overcome it properly. 
Interview with Prof Abdul Wahab Afif, Serang, 9 June 2008, and Drs H Maftuh 
Abubakar, SH, MH (head of Commission of Fatwa >of Banten MUI), 3 June 2008.  
26 Interview with Drs H Maftuh Abubakar, SH, MH (head of Commission of Fatwa >of 
Banten MUI), 3 June 2008. 
27 Neil Smelser, Collective Behaviour (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 15-18. 
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(Badan Koordinasi Penghayat Aliran Kepercayaan—coordinating 
institution for followers of the belief streams), which is responsible 
specially for dealing with belief streams.28 Therefore, the Lebak MUI’s 
leadership board submitted the case to the Bakorpakem (Badan 
Koordinasi Penghayat Aliran Kepercayaan) and to the Police.29 The 
MUI did not issue a fatwa>but advised the members of the Kandang 
Rosul to leave the group and join the mainstream Islam. Unlike the 
Kunci Suci, there was no violence against the group. It seems that this 
was caused by the fact that the MUI directly overcame the case and 
Muslim people were satisfied with it. 
Wahidiyah 
The Wahidiyah is an Islamic spiritual organisation founded by KH. 
Abdoel Madjid Ma’roef of the pesantren Kedunglo, Kediri (East Java), 
in 1963.30 He founded the Wahidiyah after getting inspiration from the 
angel through three times dream between 1959 and 1963. Unlike 
t}ari >qah which emphasises on dhikr (memorising God),31 the Wahidiyah 
promotes s}ala>wah (prayer of honour for the Prophet Muh}ammad), 
called “Salawat Wahidiyah”. The salawat wahidiyah was composed by the 
founder in 1964. The salawat constitutes an important part of 
Wahidiya’s ritual, apart from other ritual obligations, such as 
performing salat, fasting, paying zakat, and going pilgrimage to Mecca 
(h}ajj). Most Muslim organisations, including Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) 
and the Sufi order association, Jam‘iyah Ahlu ‘t-Tariqah al-Mu‘tabarah 
an-Nahdiyyah, reject to acknowledge the existence of the Wahidiyah as 
                                                          
28 Bakorpakem is an institution established during the New Order era to deal with the 
so-called “belief streams” (Aliran Kepercayaan) and authorised to consider whether or 
not certain belief stream is harmful for social harmony, especially in relations with the 
religious communities. 
29 Interview with KH Ahmad Hudhori, secretary general of the MUI of Lebak, 18 June 
2008; and KH Ichwan Hadiyin, member of fatwa > commission of the MUI of Lebak, 
17 June 2008. 
30 On further study on Wahidiyah, see Sokhi Huda, Tasawuf Kultural: Fenomena Shalawat 
Wahidiyah (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2008). 
31 The publication of Penyiar Sholawat Wahidiyah states that the Wahidiyah is not a 
Sufi order in the sense of jam‘iyyah thariqah  (tariqah order) which is known today, but a 
way (jalan) or means (sarana) to the realisation of Allah and His Prophet Muhammad. 
Penyiar Sholawat Wahidiyah, Risalah Penjelasan mengenai Sholawat Wahidiyah dan 
Ajarannya, 5th ed. (Kedunglo Kediri: Penyiar Sholawat Wahidiyah Pusat, 1978), p. 7.   
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a t}ari >qah, because of the absence of its authenticated, unbroken 
spiritual chains normally owned by a t}ari >qah from its founder to the 
Prophet Muh}ammad. As pointed out by van Bruinessen, because of 
this reason and of the founder’ clemency towards his followers’ poor 
conformity with the shari>‘ah, this movement is frequently charged with 
heterodoxy. Most of the followers of Wahidiyah are abangan (nominal 
Muslim), including ex-communists and their children.32  
After the death of its founder in 1989, the Wahidiyah split into 
three groups: First, Pengamal Wahidiyah whose headquarter is located 
in Kedunglo Kediri; second, Jamaah Wahidiyah Miladiyah also in 
Kedunglo Kediri; and third, Penyiar Sholawat Wahidiyah in Pesantren 
al-Tahdzib Rejoagung, Jombang. All three have many branches, 
especially in Java,33 including Banten. This movement was not widely 
known in Banten until the beginning of 2008, when they wanted to 
organise its national congress in the region on 11 June. When the 
committee requested the permission from the provincial police 
department, the latter consulted the MUI of Banten province. The 
Commission of Research of the MUI started to do some study and 
observation. The MUI viewed that the Wahidiyah is deviant sect that 
should be banned. The MUI found that, although the Wahidiyah was 
well accepted by people when it conducted pengajian (religious 
gathering) in Carita, in which thousands of people attended, it is 
deviant. One of the reasons of the deviancy is that its adherents regard 
their founder as “ghauthu hadhaz-zaman” (guide of this century). 
According to Wahidiyah, there is a ghauth (guide) in every century, and 
the ghauth of the 20th century was KH. Abdoel Madjid Ma’roef.34 In 
this sense, according to Prof KH Wahab Afif, the community is 
                                                          
32 Martin van Bruinessen, “Saints, Politicians and Sufi Bureaucrats: Mysticism and 
Politics in Indonesia’s New Order,” in Martin van Bruinessen and Julia Day Howell 
(eds), Sufism and the ‘Modern’ in Islam (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), p. 98. 
33 According to Moh. Ulumuddin, Penyiar Shalawat Wahidiyah has its branches in 
almost all provinces, but mostly located in Java, Madura, Bali, West Nusa Tenggara, 
Sumatera, and Kalimantan, and even in some foreign countries. Moh. Ulumuddin, 
“Syari'ah dan Tasawuf Lokal : Studi Tentang Perdebatan Legalitas Wahidiyah,” 
http://www.staia.net/2012/10/syariah-dan-tasawuf-lokal-studi-tentang.html; accessed 
23 February 2012. 
34 On “ghauthu hadhaz-zaman”, see Muhammad Ruhan Sanusi (ed.), Kuliah Wahidiyah 
untuk Menjernihkan Hati dan Ma’rifat Billah wa Rosulillah SAW (Kedunglo Kediri: Penyiar 
Sholawat Wahidiyah Pusat, n.d.), pp. 129-37. 
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deviating from the Islamic orthodoxy.35 Despite this view, the Banten 
MUI did not issue a formal fatwa> concerning the Wahidiyah,36 but gave 
recommendation to the provincial police department that the 
Wahidiyah should not be allowed to organise the national congress or 
other religious gatherings in Banten. The MUI also requested the High 
Prosecutor General of Banten to proceed the ban of the Wahidiyah.  
Ahmadiyah 
The most controversial national issue concerning Islamic sects 
since 2005 is that of Ahmadiyah. Like in other countries, the 
Ahmadiyah is divided into the Qadiyan Ahmadiyah, lead by khalifat al-
masih, the successors of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, and the Lahore 
Ahmadiyah, led by Muhammad Ali, who has tried to bring the 
Ahmadiyah closer to Sunni tradition. In Indonesia, Jamaah Ahmadiyah 
Indonesia (JAI) is a Qadiyan organization, while Gerakan Ahmadiyah 
Lahore Indonesia (GAI) is the Lahore Ahmadiyah.37 People are often 
confused about the two organizations assuming that both are the same. 
The central MUI issued fatwa> on Ahmadiyah twice, in 1980 and in 
2005; the former was issued against the Qadiyan Ahmadiyah, whereas 
the latter against both.38  
A hostile crowd led by the Front Pembela Islam (FPI - Islamic 
Defenders Front) and the Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam (LPPI 
- Islamic Research and Study Institute) attacked the campus of the 
Jamaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI—Indonesian Ahmadiyah 
Congregation) in Parung, Bogor, West Java, on 15 July 2005, 
demanding the dissolution of this organization. The second fatwa>on 
Ahmadiyah was issued less than two weeks after the FPI attack. 
According to this fatwa>, Ahmadiyah does not only deviate from Islam 
                                                          
35 The MUI chapter of Tasikmalaya issued fatwa > on the deviancy of Ahmadiyah in 
2007 with the same reason. http://news.detik.com/read/2007/09/27/125752/-
835078/159/tersulut-fatwa-menyesatkan. 
36 Interview with Prof. KH A Wahab Afif, 9 June 2008. 
37 On Ahmadiyah in general, see for instance Spencer Lavan, The Ahmadiyah movement: a 
history and perspective (Delhi: Manohar Book Service, 1974); and on Ahmadiyah in 
Indonesia, see Iskandar Zulkarnain, Gerakan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 
2005). 
38 Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Himpunan Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Jakarta: Sekretariat 
Majelis Ulama Indonesia 2010), pp. 41-2, 101-18.  
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but also it is no longer part of Islam. It is considered “non-Muslim”. 
Since then, demands on the ban of Ahmadiyah have occurred in many 
places, some of which accompanied by the use of violence. In the so-
called Monas Tragedy, the Nationalist Alliance for Religious Freedom 
and Belief (Aliansi Kebangsaan untuk Kebebasan Beragama dan 
Berkeyakinan—AKKBB) which defended the existance of the 
Ahmadiyah was attacked by FPI and Komando Laskar Islam (KLI).39 
A number of the members of FPI and KLI were arrested by the police, 
including their leader, Habib Rizieq Shihab.  The leader of KLI, 
Munarman, disappeared from public during the arrest. From his hide 
he sent a videotape to some television stations, stating that he will 
surrender only if that Ahmadiyah is dissolved. Munarman did 
surrender later after the Ministry of Religious Affairs announced that 
Ahmadiyah should not operate publicly. There were a number of 
protests organized by Garda Bangsa and GP Anshor, attached 
respectively to Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa and Nahdlatul Ulama, against 
the violence in Monas, and demanded the dissolution of the FPI.  
However, there were other groups countering these protests, 
demanding the dissolution of Ahmadiyah, the release of Habib Rizieq 
and rejecting the ban of the FPI. There were three important events in 
Banten relating to the demand to ban the Ahmadiyah. First, the MUI 
of Kota Serang issued a “Positional Statement (pernyataan sikap) of the 
MUI and Muslim Community” against Jamaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia, on 
1 June 2008. Second, five days later, the MUI of Banten and some 
other Muslim organizations issued a press conference at the Mosque of 
the Old Banten on 6 June, in which KH AS Hassan, one of the 
chairpersons of the MUI of Banten, called people to support the 
MUI’s fatwa> on Ahmadiyah, because Ahmadiyah is “deviating” and 
“out of Islam”. He also commented that the Monas tragedy was 
because the Government was too slow in responding Muslims’ 
demand to ban Ahmadiyah. In addition, because of the conflict of 
internal Muslims concerning the Munas tragedy (between supporters 
                                                          
39 Komando Laskar Islam is a coordinating command of a number of Islamic 
paramilitary groups led by Munarman, an ex-activist of human rights and legal 
advocacy. KLI is a new institution under the coordination of Forum Umat Islam 
(FUI), led by Muhammad al-Khaththath, a leader of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). 
“Laskar “Pembela Islam Akui Serang AKKBB,” Tempo Interaktif, 1 June 2008, 
www.tempo.co/read/news/2008/ 06/01/057124089/Laskar-Pembela-Islam-Akui-
Serang-AKKBB; accessed 23 February 2012. 
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of Gus Dur and of Habib Riziq), he called Muslims to be aware of the 
possible devide et impera (adu domba) between Muslim community 
themselves. The head of the Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah (FUI) of 
Pandeglang, KH M. Abduh, emphasised that both conflicting groups 
are of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) members. He said that Habib Riziq is 
also NU member.40   
Third, mass demonstration in front of the Banten parliamentary 
building on the day that the government planned to issue the Joint 
Decree on Ahmadiyah on 9 June 2008. Joint The demonstration 
supported the FPI and demanded the dissolution of Ahmadiyah. They 
were about 500 Muslims from various groups organised by Aliansi 
Masyarakat Banten (Banten Society Alliance). Some of those present at 
the press conference showed up, in the demonstration, such as KH M 
Abduh, the head of the FUI of Pandeglang, and KH Tb Fathul Azim, 
one of the leading young societal ulama.41 Abduh said again that Habib 
Riziq is also NU member, so that NU members should also support 
him and defend his organisation FPI, and he emphasise that between 
NU members should not be in conflict. It seemed that most of the 
demonstrators were of NU background, although no NU flag was 
unseen there. The demonstration was closed with Istighasah, a common 
prayer for asking God’s help, which is common in NU religious 
tradition. The general chairperson of the MUI of Serang, who is also 
board member of NU, gave a short “tausiyah” (advice) and closed the 
demonstration with prayer. As expressed in their banners, the 
demonstrators demanded four points: 1) The unity of all Muslims in 
Nusantara [Indonesia] and resolution of all conflicting groups (is}la>h}); 2) 
Dissolution of the Ahmadiyah; 3) Support of the FPI to continue 
fighting against the groups that violate faith (‘aqi>dah); 4) The release of 
Habib Riziq and his followers from prison.42 The Joint Decree 
between the Ministers of Religion, of Interior Affairs and of High 
                                                          
40 Fieldwork note, 6 June 2008. 
41 Some Islamic activists were actually suspicious of what they called “ex-NII” for 
possible violating the consensus to push their own “more radical” agenda, because in 
the coordinating meeting held on 4 June 2008, the “ex-NII” was not satisfied with the 
result of the deliberation. Interview with one of Islamist activist, on 6 June 2008. 
42 Fieldwork note, Serang, 9 June 2008. 
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Attorney, was finally issued on that day stating that Ahmadiyah should 
stop its activities, but did not ban it.43  
The demonstration was followed by public hearing with the 
Commission I of the Banten parliament. The major figures of MUI did 
not show up. One of the demonstrators told me that it is “the job of 
the youth”. This implies that they consider the MUI as “the elderly” 
and Islamic pressure groups are “the youth”. Some MUI’s leaders who 
had “youth spirit” did actually appear in the demonstration, but not in 
the public hearing with the legislators. The left the MUI because they 
need to give strong pressure on the parliament. The discussion was 
“hot” from the beginning and sometimes the audience shouted 
“Allahu akbar!” Most of the representative of the factions, including 
the nationalist Golkar and Demokrat factions, supported the 
demonstrator’s demands and promised to endorse the dissolution of 
Ahmadiyah. The above events indicated that the MUI’s fatwa>on 
Ahmadiyah had been advocated by most Islamic movements as well as 
most factions in the parliament of Banten.  
The most violent attack on Ahmadiyah community in Banten 
happened more than two years later in Cikeusik, Pandeglang, on 6 
February 2011. About 1500 people attacked the community and three 
Ahmadiyah people were killed and some other injured. Although the 
police said that the attackers were ordinary Muslims from surrounding 
villages, the fact was that the attackers were well organized since they 
used green and blue ribbons on their arms. The attack was motivated 
by the belief that Ahmadiyah is not only deviant but also infidel, 
departing from Islam, referring to both 1980 and 2005 MUI fatwa>s on 
Ahmadiyah. Although the second fatwa> forbid violence, the MUI could 
not predict what would happen with its fatwa>s in praxis. The Cikeusik 
case has shown that mob did their own violent way. Police who were 
present did not do anything to prevent the violence.  
Because of this tragedy, some ulama were arrested for being 
allegedly involved in organizing the brutal mob attack. However, after 
the protest of Islamist ulama and students, they were released because 
                                                          
43 Join Decree No 3/2008, KEP-033/A/JA/6/2008, and No 199/2008 on Warning 
and Order to the Adherences, Members or Board Members of the Indonesian 
Ahmadiyah Comunity (JAI) and Society, dated 9 Juni 2008. 
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of, as the police said, the “lack of evidence”.44 Twelve attackers were 
later sentenced from 3-6 months in jail.45 However, the most surprising 
was a victim, Deden Sujana, the former head of security for the 
Indonesian Ahmadiyah Congregation (JAI), was also sentenced to six 
month in jail.46 The reason given by the judge was that Sujana was 
found guilty of violent attack against the mob and refuse to comply 
with police chapterrs who had ordered him and other Ahmadis to 
leave Cikeusik a day before. The judge put the blame of the killing of 
his fellow Ahmadis on him. If he did comply with the police order, the 
murder would not happen. 
Against Polytheist (Shirk) Practices: Debus and Statue of Sultan 
Hasanuddin 
Polytheism or shirk is belief or practice which assumes that God is 
more than one or that there are other than God who can be worshiped 
or asked for help. Ulama across the ages have protected the ummah 
from being entrapped in polytheistic beliefs and practices. The MUI of 
Banten is part of this endeavour. In this case, there are two important 
issues related to shirk, viz., debus (invulnerability performance) and the 
plan to erect a statue of Sultan Maulana Hasanuddin, the sultan of 
Banten in the pre-modern period.  
Debus: between Sufism and Local Tradition  
The MUI of all Java and Lampung chapters met in the 
coordinating meeting (rapat koordinasi) in Serang on 11-12 Agustus 
2009. It issued a controversial recommendation (tausiyah) that the 
traditional martial performance of debus is haram, if it uses the shirk 
(polytheistic) practices, such as using satan, jinn and magic spells. It was 
controversial because the meeting was held in Serang, Banten, and 
                                                          
44 The Jakarta Post, 11 February 2011, www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/02/-
11/police-release-religious-leaders-linked-cikeusik-attack.html, accessed 2 February 
2012. 
45 Setara Institute, "Catatan atas Peradilan Kasus Penyerangan Ahmadiyah Cikeusik 
Banten,” 8 August 2011, www.setara-institute.org/en/content/catatan-atas-peradilan-
kasus-penyerangan-ahmadiyah-cikeusik-banten; accessed 2 February 2012. 
46 Heru Andriyanto, “Ahmadi Victim of Cikeusik Attack Jailed for 6 Months,” The 
Jakarta Globe, 15 August 2011, www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/ahmadi-victim-of-
cikeusik-attack-jailed-for-6-months/459531, accessed 2 February 2012. 
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debus is one of Bantenese traditional performances. It is even found 
also in some other regions, such as Aceh and West Sumatra.  
Debus (from Ar. dabbus, “needle”) is invulnerability cult or a 
performance of invulnerability by using sharp metal objects.47 
According to Martin van Bruinessen, debus is derived from practices 
usually associated with Rifa‘iyya Sufi order (tarekat) and, in the context 
of Banten, Qadiriyya.48 This is also acknowledged by the research team 
of the MUI of Banten in their research in 2004.49 The influence of the 
tarekat can be seen in three aspects of debus: First, wirid or certain 
words, formulas or prayers which read regularly in certain times, 
usually but not exclusively after obligatory prayers (shalat), which are 
believed to having spiritual power. Second, tawassul (mediation) and 
rabithah al-syaikh (relation with the sheikh), meaning using the murshid 
(spiritual guide) and his former murshids as mediation to approach God 
and presenting the sheikh or imagining the presence of the sheikh and 
the spiritual predecessors of the sheikh before beginning zikr 
(remembering God). Third, bai‘a (pledge), ijaza (authorization) and 
khilafa (deputy of murshid), meaning that disciple should plea for loyalty 
to the murshid, and if he/she receives ijazah, he/she became the 
deputy of the murshid. The debus has all of these elements so that the 
research team categorized these as part of “Islamic tradition”.  
However, the research team also found that there are also other 
elements of “local tradition”, which are pre-Islamic. The most 
important element is jangjawokan or formulation to be read which os 
believed to having spiritual power other than wirid, which is usually in 
old Javanese or Sundanese languages. The jangjawokan is now 
“Islamized” by chanting bi-smi-llahi r-rahmani r-rahim (in the name of 
Allah the Compassionate and the Merciful) or la ilaha illallah (no god 
but Allah) before reading it. The other elements are silat (traditional 
fighting performance), in which invulnerability is shown, and 
                                                          
47 Further study on Debus, see Ayatullah Khumaeni, The Phenomenon of Magic in Banten, 
Unpublished MA Thesis Leiden University, 2009; Rohman, “The result of a holy 
alliance: Debus in Banten province,” Alqalam 29:2 (May-August 2012), pp. 369-390. 
48 Martin van Bruinessen, “Kurdish `Ulama and their Indonesian Disciples,” Les 
Annales de l’Autre Islam 5 (1998), pp. 83-106. 
49 Team Peneliti, Laporan Akhir Penelitian Debus di Masyarakat Banten (Serang: Majelis 
Ulama Indonesia Provinsi Banten, 2004), pp. 17-18, 27-31.  
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accompanying music. The invulnerability is believed to be the result of 
the spiritual exercises of both Islamic and local traditions.  
The research team did not actually recommend whether debus is 
haram (not allowed), but simply offered that the debus can be seen in 
two perspectives. The first is symbolic perspective, which sees the 
phenomena of debus as indication that Islam is merely a symbol and 
trivial whose essence remains Hindu-Buddhist, animistic, dynamistic 
pre-Islamic tradition. The second is essencialist perspective which 
views Islam as being absorbed deeply into the hearth of local culture. 
The report even implies that it is better to view in the second 
perspective, by positioning it at the concluding paragraph.50    
However, the recommendation of the MUI on debus did not 
adopt this position. It rather adopted the symbolic perspective by 
saying that debus contains pre-Islamic elements. This recommendation 
socked many debus practitioners, who are mainly jawara (local tugs), in 
the region, because it means direct attack on them. This symbolises 
further contestation between the reformist ‘ulama>’ and “kiyai kitab” on 
the one hand and debus practitioners, jawara and the “kiyai hikmah”, 
‘ulama>’ who teach spiritual and magical power to the jawara or debus 
practitioners on the other hand which has taken place so far. 
Traditionally there have been mutual relations between jawara and 
debus practitioners and “kiyai hikmah” and contestation between the 
former with “kiyai kitab”. Jawara need “kiyai hikmah” to gain spiritual 
and magical knowledge as well as religious legitimacy of their spiritual 
power; whereas the “kiyai hikmah” need the jawara for social influence 
in certain layers of society, apart from possible economic gift they find 
from the jawara because of the spiritual and magical power they gave.51 
A jawara and leader of debus performance group in Lebak suspected 
that the recommendation was influenced by “`ulama>’ of Saudi”, 
meaning the Wahabi puritan `ulama>’.52 Although it is not necessarily 
                                                          
50 Team Peneliti (2004), 86. This has been also acknowledged by one of the members 
of the research team, Mohamad Hudaeri, then chairperson of the Research Center of 
the State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN) of Banten. Interview with Mohamad 
Hudaeri, June 2008. 
51 Hudaeri (2003), pp. 81-2. On the relations between Jawara and Islamic parties, 
especially PKS, see Andi Rahman Alamsyah, Islam, Jawara and Demokrasi: Geliat Politik 
Banten Pasca-Orde Baru (Jakarta: Dian Rakyat, 2009). 
52 Interview with Romly, a leader of debus group in Lebak, September 2009.  
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true, this allegation reflects the long conflict between jawara and debus 
practitioners on the one hand and the reformist `ulama>’ on the other 
hand, which is believed to be influenced by the Salafi-Wahabi 
movement. The MUI is representation of the “kiyai kitab” of both 
reformists and traditionalists which has undergone some puritanisation 
in the last decade. Indeed the MUI has been hegemonised by 
representatives of the widely known “traditionalist” Muslim 
organizations, such as Nahdlatul Ulama and, in the case of Banten, al-
Khaeriyah, there has been development to puritanisation since the 
2000 National Congress and more intensively since 2005 when a 
number of conservative fatwa>s were issued, including fatwa>s on magic 
power (kaha>nah) and prediction (‘ira>fah).53        
Statue of Sultan Hasanuddin 
The government of South Tangerang planned to create the statue 
of Sultan Maulana Hasanuddin, the sultan of Banten ruling from c. 
1552 to 1570, at a Pamulang traffic circle. They wanted to make the 
statue a symbol of local pride. However, idea was challenged by the 
MUI of Kota South Tangerang, which declared on 20 December 2009 
that the erection of a statue of Banten Sultan Maulana Hasanuddin is 
forbidden (h}ara>m). According to KH. Saidi, the local MUI chairperson, 
the statue violated Islamic teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. 
Although it would be built for educational purpose, they feared that 
people would worship the statue. There are stories of Ibrahim 
(Abraham) who destroyed the idols worshiped by the ruler and people, 
and Muh}ammad who destroyed the idols around the Ka’aba. Saidi 
suggested that it is better to build the menara (tower) of the old Banten 
Mosque, the Asmaul Husna (beautiful names of Allah), or the logo of 
Kota South Tangerang, or that the budget be allocated for other public 
purposes.54  
                                                          
53 On the puritanisation of the MUI, see Ichwan (forthcoming, 60-104). The Nahdlatul 
Ulama (NU) of Banten has different religious orientation from that of the NU in 
Central and East Java, which dominate the national board. This is evident in the case 
of Ahmadiyah discussed in this article, in which the NU of Banten supported the 
release of Habib Rizik, the leader of Front Pembela Islam, who was arrested by the 
police, and the dissolution of Ahmadiyah, whereas the central board of NU was silent 
about the case, although former NU chairperson, KH Hasyim Muzadi later suggested 
that the Ahmadiyah establishes itself as independent religion.  
54 The Jakarta Post, 21 December 2009, www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/12/21/-
local-mui-bans-banten-sultan-statue.html; accessed 1 February 2012. 
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The South Tangerang government took MUI protest into 
consideration seriously and withdrew the project. Although this cannot 
be generalised, by and large, the MUI voices concerning public 
policies, especially those which have religious impacts, have been heard 
by the local government. Despite the importance of Sultan Maulana 
Hasanuddin in Banten history, there has no such a proposal in other 
districts or municipalities. Statue is sensitive in Muslim communities. 
The vandalism of the statues happened in other Muslim majority 
regions, such as Bangkalan,55 North Sumatra,56 and Solo,57 where some 
statues of Buddhism and Christianity were destroyed. While the latter 
happened to non-Muslim religious symbols, the case of Hasanuddin 
statue had nothing to do with religious symbol of Islam. However, the 
exaggerated assumption that the statue would be worshiped implied 
the growing “puritanisation” and “conservativisation” of the MUI in 
the region.   
Against Bid‘ah Practices: Abusing the “Fake” NU `Ulama>’s 
Fatwa>  
Most MUI chapters, both central and local, including MUI of 
Banten province, prevent themselves from touching upon the 
controversial issues (ikhtila>f) between Sunni > schools (madhhabs) of law 
and theology. However, the MUI of Serang was exceptional, because it 
issued a Letter No 122/MUI-Srg/XI/2007, dated 21 November 2007, 
informing about the “fatwa> of NU ‘ulama>’ of Jombang”, East Java, 
which forbids some religious practices so far conducted by NU 
(Nahdlatul Ulama) community, such as chanting ni>yah (intent) of 
prayer loudly, qunu>t during s }ubh} (dawn) prayer, tahlilan (reading a 
number of verses and prayers), istighasah (asking God’s help trough 
                                                          
55 Three Buddhist statues were destroyed, allegedly by Islamists. http://www.-
tempo.co/read/news/2011/02/02/180310724/Situs-Mincai-di-Bangkalan-Dirusak-
Warga;  accessed 1 February 2012. 
56 The Islamist groups demanded the removal of the Budha statue at Vihara Tri Ratna, 
Tanjung Balai, North Somatra. This was supported by the local MUI and the Minister 
of Religious Affairs. http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/sumatra-buddha-statue-
must-go-ministry/433018; accessed 1 February 2012 
57 The statue of Mary at the Sendang Pawitra Mary Cave of Tawangmangu, Solo, was 
destroyed by Islamist groups; her head was cut off. http://www.harianjogja.com/-
baca/2011/12/16/gua-maria-di-tawangmangu-dirusak-orang-tak-dikenal-151693; 
accessed 1 February 2012 
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certain prayers) and visiting wali > graves. “The fatwa>of NU `ulama>’ of 
Jombang” was spread by Mahrus Ali, who claimed himself as “ex-NU” 
scholar in his book Mantan Kiyai NU menggugat Tahlilan, Istighosahan dan 
Ziarah Para Wali.58 The MUI letter triggered protests amongst NU 
leaders and members in district Serang and in Banten in general. Some 
NU members prepared to demonstrate to the MUI of Serang. 
However, the chairperson of NU of Serang, KH Matin Syarkowi, 
forbad the demonstration and asked them to entrust the NU 
leadership board to overcome the problem in peaceful way.59 KH 
Matin Syarkowi and the head of shu>ri>ah (NU consultative board) of 
Banten, KH. Ahmad Syatibi, then sent a letter demanding the general 
chairperson of MUI of Serang, KH A. Sjafe‘i AN, to withdraw the 
MUI Letter and to apologise to NU members. They argued that the 
fatwa> was fake and meant to discredit NU. The Central Board of NU 
has checked the validity of the fatwa> and found that most of the ‘ulama>’ 
mentioned in the fatwa> did not know about the fatwa>and some of them 
even already passed away long time before the fatwa>was written.60   
KH A. Syafe‘i AN did comply with the demand. He apologized to 
NU members and stated that he did not know that the fatwa>was fake.61 
As leader of Persatuan Islam (Persis), an puritanical Muslim 
movement, KH A. Sjafe‘i AN, has puritanical orientation. Persis is one 
of the most consistent puritan Muslim organisations that promotes the 
purification of Islam from religious innovations (bid‘ah) and 
superstitions (khura>fah). During the colonial and early post-colonial 
period, Persis was the main critic of NU’s religious practices, including 
that mentioned in the fatwa>.62 The fatwa>was very famous in the last few 
years amongst the puritan `ulama>’, because it is in line with their 
orthodox views. For them this fatwa>could be used to defeat their “old 
                                                          
58 Mahrus Ali, Mantan Kiyai NU menggugat Tahlilan, Istighosahan dan Ziarah Para Wali 
(Jakarta: La Tasyuk, 2006).  
59 Interview with KH Matin Syarqowi, the chairperson of NU of Serang, June 2008. 
60 Republika, 25 January 2008. 
61 Interview with KH Drs A Syefei AN, MSI, the general chairperson of the MUI of 
Serang regency, 10 June 2008. 
62 On Persatuan Islam (Persis) and its theological conflict with NU, see Howard M. 
Federspiel, Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia, (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, 1970), pp. 69-83. 
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enemy”. This was seen by NU leaders as Persis’ continuing effort of 
criticizing NU through MUI by using the alleged “fatwa>of NU `ulama>’ 
of Jombang”. Some NU leaders suspected that it was actually an effort 
to “purify” the MUI of Serang, and Serang society in general.63  
Conclusion 
The last decade has witnessed MUI’s realisation of the power of 
being perceived as “official” and “representative”, and of using them 
to endorse its Sunni-isation agendas and political interests. Although 
the MUI has proclaimed to be the “servant of ummah”, the relationship 
between MUI and government of Banten has been almost unchanged 
since the New Order, and even been more developed. Like in the New 
Order, the MUI played its “traditional” role as semi-official, institution 
which mediates between the government, parliament and Muslim 
society. Its political power stems mostly from government and 
parliamentary perception that the MUI is the representative of all 
Muslim organisations, or at least that taking side with the MUI is the 
safest way to deal with Muslim community, compared to taking side 
with other Islamic organisations. Moreover, many Muslims groups also 
view that the way to approach the government or the parliament to 
endorse certain interests and policies is through the mediation of the 
MUI. Due to this, the MUI plays distinctive role in Banten. It has 
something which is not owned by other Muslim organisations, that is, 
the “semi-officiality” and “representativeness”, if not “pseudo-
representativeness”. Established in 1975 by the government, the MUI 
has these two perceived characteristics until today. However, in many 
cases, as we have seen above, the government, police, parliament, and 
media have positioned it as “official” and “representative” `ulama>’ 
body. Its fatwa>s has been used by the police to arrest people charged by 
the MUI as deviant, and by the judges to give their verdicts. Many local 
governments also take MUI fatwa>s and opinions into consideration in 
formulating their policies. This has been reflected in the cases of 
deviant beliefs and the withdrawal of the building of Sultan 
Hasanuddin statue discussed above. This has enhanced the political 
position of the MUI in the local political arena.  
Indeed, one of the most important roles of MUI of Banten is 
guarding the politics of Sunni orthodoxy. As our discussion above has 
                                                          
63 Interview with KH Matin Syarqowi, June 2008. 
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indicated, the MUI has been demanded by Muslim leaders and society 
to evaluate the “Islamicness” of certain beliefs or sects, and issue 
fatwa>or recommendation (taus }i>yah) on them. The political contestation 
between various Muslim organisations could happen in this process. 
The mainstream has always hegemonised MUI fatwa>s, 
recommendations and discourses in the name of “protecting the 
ummah” from local, national and trans-national allegedly “deviant” 
beliefs and sects. The problem is that some of MUIs fatwa>s or its ten 
criteria of deviancy have been used or abused by certain groups to 
justify their violent acts against other groups they claimed to be deviant 
from Islamic orthodoxy. This is usually fuelled with rumours of 
allegedly deviant teachings of the groups, which are not necessarily 
true. Uncritical masses simply believed that the rumour was true and 
they thought that they had to do something to stop them, even 
through violent way. In such cases the MUI usually simply says that 
the MUI, as `ulama>’ institution, is responsible for issuing fatwa>s as part 
of guiding the ummah, but not responsible for the violence possibly 
emerging from them, because it has disclaimed in the fatwa>s or through 
media that violence is not tolerated. However, this also means that in 
the issue on deviant beliefs, polytheist and bid‘ah practices, the MUI 
has been driven by conservative, puritanical Muslim groups and 
Islamist movements. The MUI has taken the position “puritanical 
moderate Islam” to keep the trust of the government and parliament 
on the one hand, and that of Muslim society on the other. This seems 
to be the most suitable position adopted by the MUI. Yet, the absence 
of progressive `ulama>’ in the MUI could lead this organisation to be 
more conservative and puritanical, if not radical, in the future.  [] 
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